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Abstract: Negri celebrates a conception of democracy in which the concrete
powers of individual humans are not alienated away, but rather are added
together: this is a democracy of the multitude. But how can the multitude act
without alienating anyone’s power? To answer this difficulty, Negri explicitly
appeals to Spinoza. Nonetheless, in this paper, I argue that Spinoza’s philoso-
phy does not support Negri’s project. I argue that the Spinozist multitude
avoids internal hierarchy through the mediation of political institutions and
not in spite of them; nor do these institutions merely emanate from the multi-
tude as it is, but rather they structure, restrain and channel its passions. In par-
ticular, the required institutions are not those of a simple direct democracy.
There may be other non-Spinozist arguments on which Negri can ground his
theory, but he cannot legitimately defend his conception of the democratic
multitude by appeal to Spinoza.
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In recent years, Antonio Negri’s radical democratic theory (Negri 1999; Hardt
and Negri 2000, 2004) has drawn considerable attention. His theory revolves
around a distinction between constituent power and constituted power. Con-
stituent power is the direct power of the people prior to any representation: in
Negri’s terms, it is the power of the multitude. By contrast, constituted power
is the power of institutions (Negri 1999: 1–35). Negri’s radicalism lies in con-
ceiving of true democracy as a democracy of the multitude. Any limitation,
mediation or regularisation of the multitude (any taming of its constituent
power into forms of constituted power) is viewed as a betrayal of the originary
democratic authority of the people. Even if the multitude decides that rules
and procedures are necessary to the administration of life in common, vigi-
lance is required to keep such rules and procedures bound and subordinate to
the multitude’s constituent power (Negri 1999: 1–35, 303–35; Hardt and Negri
2000: 348–58; 2004: 361–4). Practically, democracy’s exemplars are social
and revolutionary movements in which humans spontaneously act together as
non-hierarchical equals (Hardt and Negri 2004: 211–9).1 Negri claims the
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philosophical underpinnings of this theory are Spinozist. Constituent power is
correlated with Spinoza’s potentia; constituted power, with potestas; and the
elusive concept of the multitude is a direct translation of Spinoza’s multitudo
(Negri 1991: passim but especially xvii–xix, 226–9; 1998; 1999: 2; 2004a;
Hardt and Negri 2000: 344, 408).
Negri’s radical democracy has been celebrated by some and criticised by
others, (Laclau 2004; Passavant 2004; Shapiro 2004; Žižek 2005; Mouffe
2006: 107–15) but in either case, his recourse to Spinoza has not generally
been questioned.2 The purpose of this paper is to place the relation to Spinoza
under scrutiny. For at the most difficult and pivotal point in his theory –
explaining how a multitude can act without forsaking its nature as multitude –
Negri appeals to Spinoza for support, often adverting to his own monographs
on Spinoza (Negri 1999: 24, 322–4; Hardt and Negri 2000: 344, 2004: 189–
90). In this paper, I argue that Spinoza’s philosophy does not in fact support
Negri’s project.3 Whereas Negri understands the multitude as a domain of
originary equality amongst humans, for Spinoza human equality is a fragile
achievement. I argue that the Spinozist multitude achieves equality through
political institutions and not in spite of them; nor do these institutions merely
emanate from the multitude as it is, but rather they structure, restrain and
channel its passions. In other words, the power of the multitude is inseparable
from the institutional mediation that shapes it. Furthermore, I deny that the
optimal expression of the power of the democratic multitude is achieved
through a pure direct democracy.
This paper poses but does not take up an invitation to translate the seven-
teenth-century institutional details of Spinoza’s democracy of the multitude to
the contemporary world. Nonetheless, whatever the precise details of that trans-
lation, they will not coincide with Negri’s radical democracy. The opening pas-
sages of the Political Treatise (Spinoza 2000; cited as TP) criticise philosophers
for their utopianism, or, in other words, for ‘conceiv[ing] men not as they are,
but as they would like them to be’ (TP 1.1). In spite of Negri’s protestations
that his own theory is not utopian (Negri 1999: 14; Hardt and Negri 2004:
xviii) his romanticised notion of the multitude neither conceives of humans as
they are, nor even as they can be once alienating political structures are
removed, but rather as Negri would like them to be. There may be other non-
Spinozist arguments on which Negri can ground his theory, but he cannot
defend his conception of the democratic multitude by appeal to Spinoza.
The Problem of the Democratic Multitude
The core difficulty for Negri’s proposed democracy of the multitude is how to
conceive the capacity of the multitude to exercise political agency without
surrendering its character as a multitude (Hardt and Negri 2000: 394–400;
2004: 100, 350). Negri recognises the seriousness of this difficulty, and uses
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an exegesis of Spinoza both to characterise the problem (this section) and to
pose a solution (the following section).
In Latin, there are two different words standardly translated into English as
power: potentia and potestas. The distinction between the two generally cor-
responds to a distinction between power as a concrete capacity, and power as
a juridical entitlement or authority. The theory of politics in the social contract
tradition centres on the latter term, potestas. It imagines individuals becoming
political subjects by transferring to the sovereign an authority to use their
capacities (potentiae). This authority is the sovereign’s power (potestas); it is
a constituted power arising out of and superseding the constituent power of
the masses. Hobbes is the exemplar of this tradition; in correlating right with
power (potestas), he attributes to the sovereign in any political order the
absolute authority to represent the people; the people must simply obey (Negri
1991: 112–14, 140; 1998: 222–3; Hobbes 1994: xvii.13). Negri situates Spin-
oza in the alternative and opposed tradition of ‘republican materialism’.
Republican materialists favour a political realism concerned with the concrete
determination of the social domain; that is, with potentia. Political power
always remains concretely in the bodies of the human individuals who make
up the multitude. Consequently, any political order that attempts to obfuscate
the popular ground of political power, for instance by attributing authority to
rule to a monarchy or an aristocracy, finds itself inherently weaker and more
fragile than democracy (Negri 1991: 195; 1998: 226–7; 2004a: 103, 110–11).
Spinoza’s own idea of imperium absolutum (absolute rule or sovereignty) has
nothing to do with a juridically transcendent sovereign; because power is con-
ceived concretely, absolute power can only be achieved in democracy (demo-
craticum imperium). ‘For if there is such a thing as absolute sovereignty
[imperium absolutum], it is really that which is held by the people as a whole
[integra multitudo]’ (TP 8.3; cited at Negri 1998: 228). Thus, when Spinoza
infamously asserts that right is coextensive with power (potentia), this does
not amount to the unsavoury dictum that might makes right, nor to some per-
verse redefinition of oppression as freedom as it appeared in Hobbes. Rather,
it amounts to a conception of freedom and right which refuses juridical mysti-
fication (Negri 1991: 192–3; 1998: 225–6).
Negri recognises that constituted power can take on democratic forms.
Indeed, despite a predilection for monarchy, Hobbes grants that a democratic
assembly can be the absolute representative of the will of the people just as a
monarch can (1994: xix.1). At the same time, Hobbes insists that the multitude
does not have a will nor a capacity for agency; the disordered crowd needs to
be represented in order to act. He entirely rejects the idea that there could be a
democracy of the multitude (1994: xvi.13, xvii.4). Against the Hobbesian
refusal, Negri claims that Spinoza offers a democracy which remains of the
multitude, and avoids any alienation into constituted powers (1998: 225–6).
To understand what this might mean, it is first necessary to understand
more clearly the nature of the multitude. Negri appeals to the TP’s two differ-
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ent accounts of how people combine together in groups, which he casts as a
distinction between potestas and potentia (1991: 190–7). On the one hand, a
group can be vertically constituted, as when one person has another in their
power (sub potestate habere) (TP 2.9–11). This occurs on a grand scale in the
case of aristocracies and monarchies; it constitutes a relation of command and
submission. On the other hand, the simplest type of combination occurs hori-
zontally, when two people join their forces together, thereby achieving a
greater power (potentia) than they possessed individually, and correspondingly
a greater right (TP 2.13; Negri 1998: 225; 2004b: 16). For Negri, this is the
foundational metaphysical principle of the multitude. Negri characterises indi-
vidual humans as ‘free singularities’; they each have their own concrete mate-
rial existence, constituted from their own actual desires and capacities. In
Negri’s view, the multitude adds these singularities (these actual bodies of cit-
izens or subjects) together as equals on a flat social plane (1998: 225, 228;
1999: 330–2). The multitude is the complex materiality of the populace in
which ‘[e]ach singularity is a foundation’ (Negri 1998: 235).
In order for a multitude to act, its power taken as a whole will have a vertical
relation to its individual members. In principle this is acceptable and does not
constitute an alienation of power, so long as this command of the whole is
flattened onto the concrete multitude: this is the fundamental idea of Negri’s
democracy of the multitude (Negri 1998: 230; 2004b: 17).
[B]y traversing the multitudo of subjects, democracy becomes absoluteness, for it
puts all social powers into motion from below, and from the equality of a natural
condition. Democracy as an omnino absoluta form of government means, then,
that there is no alienation of power – neither in relation to its exercise, nor in rela-
tion to its formation or the specificity of the executive action, that is, the specificity
of the figure of magistracy. (Negri 1998: 228)
However, this democracy of the multitude faces a difficulty. How can the mul-
titude act and exercise power without ceasing to be a multitude? The problem
arises because the multitude lacks real unity: it remains physically and objec-
tively ‘an elusive totality of singularities’ (Negri 1998: 231). Any collection
of individuals will have desires and intentions pulling in different directions.
If such a group nonetheless acts, its power can no longer be ‘of’ the whole
group in a material sense, because it has not incorporated the powers of all its
individual members. It is this problem that gives rise to representationalist
accounts of a group’s will: for if the multitude can be said to be transcended
by a single will of the people which absorbs and eliminates the singularity of
its component parts, this explains how an action can be attributed to a group
as a whole despite internal disagreement. It is not only Hobbes who takes this
view: when Hegel equates absolute sovereignty with freedom, in the same
gesture he dismisses the multitude as a mere heap of people (Negri 1998:
229). For Negri, by contrast, any popular rule which relegates the multitude
in this way thwarts freedom and is not truly absolute (1991: 190–1). Negri’s
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gloomy interim conclusion is that the tension between democracy and the
multitude is unsolvable. ‘Every value, every choice, every political act must
be deployed on the basis of the incomplete relationship between the absolute-
ness of power and the multiplicity of propositions, needs, and experiences’
(1998: 232).
Negri concedes that Spinoza’s earlier text, the Theological-political Trea-
tise, (Spinoza 2001; cited as TTP) poses what may appear to be a solution: the
principled toleration of singularities.
The nonsolution of the problem of the political subject becomes the foundation of
tolerance, of respect for consciences, of freedom to philosophize. The multitudo, in
its paradoxical nature, is the foundation of democracy insofar as it allows each
individual to introduce into society his own values of freedom. (Negri 1998: 235)
Nonetheless, this is not truly a solution. For first, not all politics and life in
society with others can be privatised as tolerance. There is an irreducible
need to act on common matters, and this demands a unity that it is not clear
the multitude possesses. It is possible that individuals all desire different
things, and do not have enough common feeling to come to agreement (Negri
1998: 235). And second, even achieving unity as a society of extensive toler-
ation may be elusive; this would require the multitude already to be rational
enough to desire to tolerate differences. For several common passions work
against the willingness to tolerate diversity (Spinoza 1994: E IIIP31C,
IIIP31S, IVP34S, IVP37S1; cited as E). 
For Negri, Spinoza’s later TP provides a more profound response, in the
form of an advocacy of radical democracy which does not rest content with
the liberal privatisation of differences (1991: 118–19, 186). The unification of
the populace into a mass democratic subject capable of action must not be
achieved by normative or juridical fiat; for this would be to outstrip the real
concrete nature of the powers of individuals. But unification can be achieved
if there is a real concrete change to those powers so that in fact they converge:
‘a convergence of cupiditates [desires], to the extent that under the aegis of
reason, the latter are materially displaced from the individual good to the col-
lective good’ (Negri 1998: 237). The name for this required orientation to the
common good is pietas: piety or, better, morality (as in the Curley translation).
Spinoza defines pietas as ‘[t]he desire to do good generated in us by our living
according to the guidance of reason’ (E IVP37S1). For Spinoza, humans are
opposed to one another only insofar as they are governed by passion; when
they are governed by reason, their ends align, and the tension between the pri-
vate interest and the common good is eliminated. Reason teaches that ‘[t]o
man, then, there is nothing more useful than man. Man, I say, can wish for
nothing more helpful to the preservation of his being than that ... all, together,
should seek for themselves the common advantage all’ (E IVP18S). If such
genuine change in cupiditates can be achieved, then their singular wills will in
fact have the same orientation, and will in fact be unified (Negri 1998: 237).
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Negri’s account of pietas thus specifies the conditions under which a
democracy can truly be a democracy of the multitude. Negri’s Spinozist exe-
gesis is supposed to ground a practical or liberatory politics;4 whether it suc-
ceeds will depend on how readily these conditions of pietas are achieved. To
be sure, Negri’s pietas does not appear to demand the ethical virtue of the per-
fectly rational and free philosopher, but rather a political virtue accessible in
principle to everyone: commitment to equality and to the common good (See
E IVP37S2). But even so, what ground is there to think that the multitude
would ever have this pietas? The contrary view, that multitudes always retain
tendencies towards hierarchy and faction, seems just as plausible.
Negri’s Spinozist Solution
Negri’s first defence of the multitude’s pietas draws on Spinoza’s Ethics to
argue that individuals in fact come to have pietas, or in other words, to desire
the good of their fellow humans, because securing and advancing the wellbe-
ing of fellow humans serves each individual’s own virtue and power (potentia).
Negri draws attention to passages such as E IVP35C2, in which Spinoza says
this reason and virtue arise naturally from the effort of the individual (their
striving, or conatus) to preserve themselves and seek their own advantage;
and everyone does strive to seek their own advantage. Furthermore, for Spin-
oza, far from there being a conflict between one’s own advantage on the one
hand and sociable behaviour on the other, the truly rational individual under-
stands that his or her advantage lies in establishing community with other
human beings. ‘[M]en who are governed by reason – that is, men who, from
the guidance of reason, seek their own advantage – want nothing for them-
selves which they do not desire for other men. Hence, they are just, honest,
and honorable’ (E IVP18S). Sociable behaviour in turn assists the further
development of reason in a community, by reducing the frequency and severity
of sad passions. Thus, through the process of increasing and mutually rein-
forcing pietas, pietas begets unity which begets still more pietas, with the
result that a unified political subject is produced capable of bearing absolute
sovereignty without effacing the singularity of individuals. In other words, the
‘tendency toward the collective’ is driven by ‘the ontologically multiplicative
function of pietas and honesty’ (Negri 1998: 238; see also Hardt and Negri
2004: 189–90; Negri 2004b: 14). Democracy is ‘the limit toward which tend
the absoluteness of the mass and the constitutive singularity of potentiae, in
other words, the multitudo and pietas’ (Negri 1998: 240).
Such an answer taken alone immediately invites scepticism: it is hard to
discern a constant tendency towards sociability in the real world. Negri’s sec-
ond defence of the multitude’s pietas places an important qualification on his
argument: the multitude only in fact increases its power under certain circum-
stances, namely if it is not hampered by an external force, such as a political
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structure which alienates away its power (1998: 239–40, also 230, 234).5
Indeed, Spinoza asserts that a ruler can keep people servile, dividing them
amongst themselves and keeping them in fear and away from reason (TP 5.6).
But once the alienating structures are removed, in Negri’s view the actually
existing multitude will have a potentia outweighing its passivity, and it will
embark on a virtuous spiral of increase (1998: 237–9). This optimism regard-
ing the multitude’s ontological tendency towards virtue is grounded in an
asymmetrical view of institutions. Good non-alienating democratic institutions
do not need to be externally imposed, for they emanate from the multitude:
‘[t]he institution is thus factually the extrinsic figure of an irrepressible natural
process’ (Negri 1998: 241, see also 228). It follows that the removal of bad
alienating institutions, for instance by revolution, should reveal a multitude of
pre-political singularities on a horizontal plain of equality that will not tend to
regenerate the bad institutions. Indeed, for this reason Negri equates the power
of Spinoza’s multitude with the constituent power of social movements against
ossified institutions (1991: xxii, 210, 229).6
Negri’s third defence of the multitude’s pietas invokes a progressive view
of history. The multitude’s tendency towards virtue in specific contexts is
undergirded by a larger ‘power of the totality of being’ that moves through
‘constitutive process’ towards self-formation and ethicality (Negri 1991: 112–
13). Specifically, despite temporary setbacks incurred by the hostile force of
alienating political structures, in Negri’s view the ontological force of the mul-
titude’s conatus is so great that it inches towards collective virtue through his-
tory. He insists that this collective realisation is not a utopia, but a real material
process (1991: 210–29). To be sure, he refuses to hold up a single determinate
form towards which the multitude moves. But this does not mean that the
movement of the multitude through history lacks direction. Rather, the absence
of a determinate ideal of democracy of the multitude corresponds to the fact
that the reality of social practice (the concrete nature of the multitude) is
always shifting. Although there will have to be juridication formalisations of
the multitude’s power, these formalisations always need to be ready to be
changed (Negri 1998: 240). Negri proposes that in our earthly political
predicament, absoluteness might helpfully be conceived as ‘the political
process in its complexity’, or in other words, as the perpetual effort to match
the juridical subject of power to social practice (1998: 241).
The Multitude’s Power: Spinoza against Negri
Negri insists that political theory both is and ought to be contested at the level
of metaphysics (1991: 43, 211–17; 1998: 220, 225–6, 231; 2004b: 12–13). In
this spirit, in this section I examine Negri’s account of Spinoza’s metaphysics,
finding that he gravely misrepresents Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, and that he
offers an untenable account of the composition of individual powers to form a
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multitude. Once these errors are corrected, a rather different solution to the
problem of democracy of the multitude emerges.
Negri attributes to Spinoza a commitment to a directionality in nature, a
commitment that fits well with Negri’s Marxianism (1991: xx; 1998: 223).
However, this attribution is unsustainable. Spinoza’s God has no ends, and
God is the same as nature: Spinoza denies there is purposive movement in
nature (E IP29, IP33, IApp). Negri’s error is generated by his conflation of the
two senses of potentia (power) (Macherey 1983: 29–30). The first sense
denotes an individual’s behaviour; what it in fact does. This is the individual’s
potentia as part of nature, or what is the same, as part of God (TP 2.3). By
contrast, the second sense denotes behaviour of an individual that can be
understood in terms of the laws its own nature, or in other words, its action
(actio) (E IVP4D). This active power proper to an individual is its virtue and
freedom. To the extent each thing acts, its behaviour is the product of its own
power (potentia), and by this power each thing strives (conatur) to persevere
in being (E IIIP6). Yet countless things do not in fact manage to increase or
maintain their power; for a thing not only acts, but may also be acted upon
(pati), when it behaves in a way which does not accord with the laws of its
own nature. To the extent a thing is acted upon, its behaviour is the product of
the power and conatus of other things impinging upon it (E IIID2, IIIP4–7,
IVD). Indeed, the behaviour of all individuals except God is determined not
purely by the individual’s own power but also by the power of things around it
(E IVP2–4).
As a result, in Spinoza’s metaphysics there is no direct practical conse-
quence arising from the identification of a thing’s conatus; even if this conatus
is characterised as an innate or inherent tendency of the thing, it will only be
actualised if the context of other powers around it is conducive. A finite indi-
vidual strives towards increase of its potentia to the extent it can; but whenever
it fails to do so, this simply shows that some other finite individual has suc-
ceeded; and Spinoza’s God neither privileges one individual’s striving over
those of any other, nor guarantees that all individuals equally realise their
striving.7 Consequently, Negri errs in identifying a real directional tendency
in nature in general. He also errs in conflating the multitude’s freedom and
activity with what in fact it tends to do. There are numerous passages in the
Ethics which argue that unmediated juxtaposition of human powers in the mul-
titude leads to instability, fear and discord (E IVP40, IVP45C2); and which
envisage limits to the powers of the multitude, and its tendency to sad and
vicious passions (E IVP54S, IVP58S, IVP70). These passages suggest that,
far from there being a virtuous spiral towards pietas, vicious behaviour may
lead to an escalation of passion and a dissipation of power. Negri explicitly
dismisses these passages as testifying to the ‘unfinished character’ of E’s pol-
itics, and then trumps them with passages speaking of the multitude’s conatus
towards virtue (1998: 237–8). But even if the multitude’s potentia qua finite
individual includes a striving and a tendency towards pietas, identifying this
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disposition is entirely insufficient to determine the multitude’s actual behav-
iour. Negri often insists upon the elusive or contradictory character of the mul-
titude, but I suspect this elusiveness follows from his own equivocation (1998:
238–9; 2004b: 16).
Spinoza affirms and does not deny the commonsense concern that a com-
munity of people may be internally hostile or hierarchical, and that even if the
community’s power would lie in harmony, there is no necessary tendency in
this direction. Spinoza’s concern with the dissociative tendencies of the multi-
tude is not limited to the Ethics, but is also to be seen in TP.8 Directly after
introducing the idea of a horizontal union of human powers, Spinoza dampens
the optimism that Negri draws from the idea by observing that hateful passions
draw humans apart, and that humans ‘are by nature especially subject to these
emotions’ (TP 2.14). Spinoza insists on the prevalence of vicious behaviour
amongst humans: it is quite certain
that men are necessarily subject to passions, and are so constituted that they pity
the unfortunate, envy the fortunate, and are more inclined to vengeance than com-
passion. Furthermore, each man wants others to live according to his way of think-
ing, approving what he approves and rejecting what he rejects. Consequently, since
all men are equally desirous of preeminence, they fall to quarrelling and strive their
utmost to best one another; and he who emerges victorious is more elated at having
hindered someone else than at having gained advantage for himself. (TP 1.5)
Riven by the passions, humans placed in proximity are just as likely to prey
upon one another as to protect one another.
Negri’s most plausible line of defence of the practicality of a politics of the
multitude’s unmediated constituent power is his argument that the multitude’s
tendency towards virtue will be expressed only if alienating institutions are
removed. Correspondingly, Spinoza’s pessimistic passages are explained as
pertaining to the multitude only under alienating institutions. Nonetheless,
this defence also fails, as I will show by considering the sources of weakness
within an individual’s constitution. Via the conatus doctrine, an individual
strives for their power to the extent that they can. Whether an individual is
able to act or whether they are passive depends on the relation between their
own powers and the powers they confront. Consider an individual human. An
individual human’s power consists in their physical capacities and their reason
and virtue (E IVP21–4). If they are unable to sustain or increase their power,
it may be because the external powers they face are very great: for instance,
violence and oppression at the hands of other humans. But it can also be that
their own power is very weak. Even given physical security, a human individ-
ual may not be sufficiently internally well organised and strong to negotiate
the world around them on their own rational terms, instead being tossed by
each moment’s passions. Thus, it is not only gross external forces which pre-
vent individuals from living virtuously and increasing their virtue over time
(E IVPref). In the case of the multitude, I argue analogously that the multitude
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can have (indeed, tends to have) internal structural weakness such that no
increase of virtue spontaneously arises.
This internal weakness is obscured in Negri’s account. Recall the strongly
horizontal character of Negri’s Spinozist multitude. Negri characterises the
multitude as a pure addition of free singularities, and equates these singulari-
ties with individuals’ potentiae and their freedom (1998: 226, 240). By this
term singularity, he means what individuals tend to do, when their power is
not politically alienated from them. The situation of non-alienation is posi-
tively characterised as ‘the liberation of all social energies in a general conatus
of the organization of the freedom of all’ (Negri 1998: 228). Thus Negri’s
account relies on conceiving of human singularities as things which can be
put in relation yet remain as equals. Their lack of piety simply means it is dif-
ficult to get them to agree; achieving piety allows the addition of free singu-
larities to form a unity with one will (Negri 1998: 235, 237). But to the
contrary, I argue that Negri’s singularities, to the extent they are not already
pious, tend to form hierarchies. In consequence, a multitude of Negri’s singu-
larities, even when liberated from alienating institutions, itself constantly gen-
erates hierarchy internal to itself. Any equality within the multitude is an
achievement rather than a starting point, and the means to that achievement
are importantly institutional.
On Spinoza’s account, individuals tend to enter into hierarchical relations.
Friendship is surely the paradigm of a horizontal combination of singular
human forces (TP 2.13). But imagine a friendship in which one person is wiser
than the other, as surely often occurs. The less wise individual may be reliant
on the wiser individual’s judgement, and also loyal to that wiser individual as
a benefactor. To the extent this occurs, Spinoza concludes the wiser individual
has the less wise individual in their power (sub potestate habet) (TP 2.10–11).
This innocuous example suggests that unions of human potentiae are likely to
feature hierarchy, such that a union’s collective power is not equally deter-
mined by each individual member. The term potestas is used not merely for
juridically alienated authority, but also for concrete and unavoidable hierar-
chical power in interpersonal relations, even harmless ones. Not all scenarios
are so innocuous, and Spinoza suggests several hostile ones: ‘[o]ne man has
another in his power [sub potestate habet] if he holds him in bonds, or has
deprived him of the arms and means of self defence or escape, or has terrorised
him’ (TP 2.10). Here, the hierarchy within the union alienates the singularity
of one of the union’s members. There may also be a whole range of intermedi-
ate scenarios, such as abusive friendship. Spinoza explicitly claims that the
only way such relations would not emerge is if the humans concerned were
‘altogether free’ or entirely guided by reason, for in this case, neither passion
nor ignorance nor force subjects them to other people (TP 2.11; E IVP30–5).
As a corollary, the multitude can only spontaneously be an equal combina-
tion of free singularities after the perfect rationality of its subjects is achieved.
However, even the most virtuous multitude lies a long distance from this philo-
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sophical standard of rationality. A multitude features people of all different
ages, and Spinoza insists that everyone is born without reason, and even if
they achieve it, it takes the most part of their lives (TTP 16/174). Conse-
quently, ‘those who believe that ordinary people ... can be persuaded to live
solely at reason’s behest are dreaming of the poets’ golden age or of a fairytale’
(TP 1.5). The practical upshot is that hierarchical relations systematically arise
in social interaction; the multitude cannot be conceived as a collection of non-
hierarchical singularities. Some of these relations are in accord with reason
(for instance, the wise person guiding a less wise friend), but some are not
(for instance, a bully terrorising those around them). Negri stresses the natural,
pre-political character of Spinozist democratic freedom: the challenge is for it
to avoid ‘renouncing its own naturalness’ (1998: 225). But against this, there
is no originary purity to the multitude; the multitude may itself be weak and
fail to tend towards virtue even without reference to alienating institutions.
Hierarchical relations between individuals structure the multitude, and
some of these relations are alienating. But if we consider political institutions
simply as more elaborate types of relations, it follows that even the most alien-
ating institutions that Negri (and Spinoza) are most concerned to critique are
part of the actual existence of the multitude. The multitude has political order
to correspond to its degree of freedom of power: all different forms of sover-
eignty are grounded in the potentia of the multitude (TP 2.17). To be sure, the
sovereignty is less absolute the more alienated it is. But on my reading, this
just shows that the multitude with alienated institutions itself had less power
to offer, not that the power was somehow dissipated in the process of its alien-
ation to the sovereign. The existence of good institutions indicates the strength
of the multitude, whereas the existence of a very alienating political order, for
instance, Hobbesian centralised absolute monarchy testifies to the weakness
and lack of virtue of multitude.9
This point has sobering implications not only for radical democrats whose
faith is vested in a spontaneous constituent power of the multitude, but also
for enthusiasts of institutional design, who would seek to remedy all ills by
the imposition of good institutions. For a multitude which has lived under
alienating institutions will tend to lack virtue and reason and be likely to have
a high level of such alienation latent in it. As a consequence, if alienating
institutions are simply removed, for instance by revolution, the result will
either be war or the resurgence of more bad institutions. It is foolish ‘to get rid
of a tyrant while yet the causes that have made the prince a tyrant cannot be
removed’ (TP 5.7). Equally, the imposition of institutions which correspond to
a higher degree of virtue is unlikely to succeed. For the foothold of bad insti-
tutions is the low degree of potentia of the particular multitude in question
(TP 7.26; TTP 18/209–11).
If institutions correspond to a particular state of the power of the multitude,
how does change come about? How does a weak multitude with alienated rule
increase its power so that it is powerful enough to ward off alienated rule?
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Spinoza’s answer is that although institutions will only be effective and durable
if they fit with the actual state of the multitude, nonetheless, in moments of
clarity people can make incremental modifications to institutions (TP 1, 5.1–
4). And some institutions, whilst fitting to the current state of power of the
multitude, nonetheless serve to increase multitude’s power.
Institutions need to cleave to some extent to the realities of humans as they
exist in their specific degree of powerlessness. Spinoza insists that just because
a ruler has the highest right, it does not follow that they have power to make
citizens do anything at all (for instance, to make them fly) (TP 4.4). Further-
more, even though it is possible to make quite extreme change in citizens’
conduct through coercive means, a good ruler will not do so, instead striving
to facilitate the continued activity of citizens in a way that the citizens can
recognise as their own (TP 10.8). However, it does not follow from this that
non-alienating institutions merely follow the actual contours of the populace,
emanating from it without attempting to shape it. Spinoza explicitly rejects
granting each the right to live as they please: for this is war and insecurity (TP
3.3). At minimum, for virtue to increase in the multitude, institutions need to
constrain the sources of human distress and insecurity (TP 2.21). And beyond
this, institutions should not merely limit violence, but substantively shape sub-
jects towards the common good. Because people are not constituted to desire
what is most to their advantage,
the state must necessarily be so established that all men, both rulers and ruled,
whether they will or no, will do what is in the interests of their common welfare;
that is, either voluntarily or constrained by force or necessity, they will all live as
reason prescribes (TP 6.3).
Consequently, it is not the pre-political multitude which by itself is non-hier-
archical and committed to the common good, and therefore is capable of exer-
cising power. Rather, such a powerful multitude is achieved only through the
mediation of well-designed institutions:
But just as the vices of subjects and their excessive licence and wilfulness are to be
laid at the door of the commonwealth, so on the other hand their virtue and steadfast
obedience to the laws must be attributed chiefly to the virtue and absolute right of
the commonwealth (TP 5.3).
That is, the active intervention of institutions is needed to secure equality of
condition, to limit self-destructiveness and channel sentiment towards rational
(public-spirited) behaviour (TP 1.6, 5.2, 10.9), producing the outward form of
virtue (and the space for the possibility of its reality) rather than relying on it
as a cause.
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Institutional Implications
The reader might suspect that the differences identified in the previous sec-
tions are insignificant. Negri argues that Spinoza advocates institutions that
flatten onto multitude; I by contrast argue that Spinoza advocates institutions
that shape the multitude. However, if in both cases we understand Spinoza to
be calling for direct democratic institutions,10 then we have a theoretical dis-
tinction without any practical difference. Against this suspicion, I now show
that in fact the theoretical disagreements lead to substantive institutional dif-
ferences. I argue that for Spinoza the power of the multitude is not necessarily
best expressed in thoroughgoing direct democracy. Rather than characterise
Spinoza as a direct democrat, it is better to characterise him first of all as an
advocate of rule of law, who thinks that popular institutions often, but not
always, help secure this rule of law.11
Spinoza’s final view of the institutional form of a democracy of the multi-
tude cannot be determined directly from his texts, because TP’s chapter on
democracy was not complete at the time of his death. However, the preceding
chapters provide an extremely detailed consideration of the mechanisms of
aristocratic and monarchical government, suggesting something similar might
apply for democracy.12 These constitutions are crafted with view to constrain-
ing the conduct of rulers, and effectively mobilising their desires and passions
towards the common good (TP 7–10). Nonetheless, Negri rejects any sugges-
tion that the non-mass institutions in Spinoza’s aristocracy and monarchy have
any corollary or lesson for democracy: the analysis of monarchy and aristoc-
racy features ‘a disproportion between the metaphysical role played by the
notion of “absolute government” and the guiding idea of the multitudo on the
one hand, and the analytical and experimental contents of the constitutional
analysis on the other’. He anticipates that the chapter on democracy, had it
been completed, would have eliminated this institutional complexity (2004b:
21; see also Matheron 1986: 120–1). Democracy is ‘a council composed of
the multitude as a whole’; ‘democracy as the totality of citizens assembled
together’ (Negri 2004a: 102, 111; see also 2004b: 19–21). Even though Negri
concedes the need for ‘functions of control’ (1998: 227–8) and even though
he thinks that democracy should be animated by tolerance and respect for con-
science (1998: 235), he attributes to Spinoza the view that no constitutional
limitation is required: the power of the multitude inherently has its own limits,
in the sense that oppressive laws will provoke revolt and will thus undermine
themselves (2004b: 18).13
There is some merit to the view that Spinoza supports mass popular rule.
Spinoza claims that democracy has potential to be the most absolute and free
political form (TP 11.1); his discussions of aristocracy and monarchy propose
that absoluteness can be approached by approximating popular rule (TP 7.31,
8.4). However, Negri’s explanation, that such rule reflects the multitude’s
nature as a collection of free singularities, miscasts Spinoza’s reasoning. The
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problem is that rulers are mere humans, prone to forsake the common good
for private gain (TP 1.6, 7.27). Forms of popular rule are advocated even in
non-popular orders not because the individual singularities that form the mul-
titude are virtuous or because respecting and responding to individual singu-
larity is valued for its own sake. Rather, precisely when individual human
singularities are so prone to vice, an institutional structure which secures and
relies on the equal standing and influence of a plurality of self-interested indi-
viduals can best approximate the common good, and thereby best express and
advance the multitude’s power.
Furthermore, it is clear that for Spinoza, popular rule is an imperfect and
partial solution to the political problem of securing the common good. No
states ‘have proved so short-lived as popular or democratic states, nor have
any been so liable to frequent rebellion’ (TP 6.4). Democracies do not main-
tain themselves; when they are not overcome by rebellion or war, they tend to
degenerate into aristocracies and thence monarchies. The reason is ‘men are
by nature enemies, and even when they are joined and bound together by
laws they still retain their nature’ (TP 8.2). Direct democratic popular rule
can harbour pathologies which run counter to the goal of increased unity,
virtue and reason: majority tyranny and oppression of minorities, but also
partisan and other short-sighted legislation which undermines the constitu-
tional form, subjects’ equality, and the multitude’s power in the long run. I
now turn to consider what other kinds of institutions might be able to address
these shortcomings.
Against a view that the best monarchy follows the will of the monarch
alone, Spinoza argues that the best monarchy is one which is organised around
rule of law: ‘it is in no way contrary to practice for laws to be so firmly estab-
lished that not even the king can repeal them’. The law can hold the political
order to reasonable conduct even as the whim and passion of the monarch
tends away from it. Spinoza argues this is consistent with the obligation to
absolute obedience to the king. ‘For the fundamental laws of the state should
be regarded as the king’s eternal decrees’: and ministers should refuse to carry
out commands contrary to these fundamental laws. Just as Ulysses was bound
to the ship’s mast for his own good, so too will a wise monarch subject itself
to these laws (TP 7.1). As a corollary, I suggest that for Spinoza obeying the
will of the people as it is in fact expressed in a democratic assembly would not
be the best way to order a democracy; for the multitude, like the king, can be
subject to whims and passions. Instead, a populace ought to consider the law
supreme. And just as the law-governed monarchy is still truly a monarchy, so
too if people hold the law above the actual will of the people in a democracy,
this in no way diminishes the sovereignty of the people.
For Spinoza, the idea of rule of law alone is not enough: ‘the main task is
to show how it can be brought about that men, whether led by passion or by
reason, may still keep their laws firm and sure’ (TP 7.2). This task is met in
two main ways. First, in carrying out their tasks, state functionaries and min-
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isters must find their private advantage aligned with the general welfare; for
people always pursue their own advantage with keenness (TP 7.4). Second,
the foundations of the political order need to be set up so that they ‘are strong
and cannot be dismantled without arousing the indignation of the better part
of an armed people’ (TP 7.2). This latter point links rule of law to the power of
the people, which might seem to favour Negri’s direct democratic reading. On
this basis, Negri dismisses the institutional details of TP’s monarchies and
aristocracies as having no relevance for democracy. But this conclusion is pre-
mature, as I will show by investigating what concretely it means to ground
rule of law in popular power.
The entire patriciate of an aristocracy forms the aristocratic council which
is the aristocracy’s sovereign (TP 8.1, 8.16). The patriciate does not coincide
with the entire political community as the democratic multitude does. Yet the
patriciate, considered not in its relation to the commoners but in its relation to
itself and conceived as a patrician multitude, faces the very same problem as
the democratic multitude. Insofar as its members are not perfectly virtuous, it
always risks ruling in a manner that undermines equality amongst patricians
and corrupts the aristocratic form. Spinoza’s solution is for the patriciate ‘to
be so bound together by the laws as to form, as it were, a single body directed
by a single mind’ (TP 8.19). Rule of law coordinates and constrains patricians’
actions towards the common advantage.
Spinoza is quite clear that the patriciate cannot rely on itself, as the very
same body that makes the law, to uphold and maintain it: the temptation to
bend the law for one’s friends and associates is too powerful (TP 8.19). A
guardian of the laws separate from the patrician council is required: a sub-
council of syndics (TP 8.20). Careful structuring of incentives goes some way
to explaining how the syndics can succeed where the patrician assembly would
fail. In order not to be dependent on the patriciate which they are supposed to
discipline, they are appointed for life; but to prevent them becoming arrogant
from long tenure, they are selected from the elder people of the state (TP
8.21). They are paid ‘such that they cannot maladminister affairs of state with-
out great loss to themselves’ (TP 8.24). Specifically, they keep the fines they
collect from patricians who fail to perform their civic duties; and they collect
a coin from each householder, allowing them to know the size of the populace
(TP 8.25). Such imposed incentives have a greater weight and effect than those
which a supreme ruling body might establish for itself. For the structure of
these incentives is imposed by the power of the patriciate as a whole; the syn-
dics cannot modify any aspects of these that they find inconvenient. In turn,
the patricians will be able to enforce these incentives because the syndics’ role
is limited: it is relatively simple to see and judge when it is being carried out
well, which is not the case when it comes to the broader task of ruling an
entire political order.
The effectiveness of the syndics depends on their being grounded in the
power of the patriciate, not merely in the sense that the patriciate could support
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them if it chose, but that it will actually be inclined to so do. The syndics will
not be able to guard the law if the patriciate ignore their rulings or subvert
their institutional structure. Is it unrealistic to expect the patricians to lend
support to a body which often thwarts their desires and is insulated from their
control? To the contrary, such an expectation does not rely on the patricians
having a constant virtuous nature: if they have some minimal recognition of
the benefit of no one being able to act with impunity, they will be inclined to
support the syndics. For the syndics’ sole duty is ‘to ensure that the laws of the
state regarding assemblies and ministers of state are kept inviolate’; they have
the power only ‘to bring to judgment any minister guilty of transgressing the
regulations pertaining to his office and to condemn him in accordance with
established law’ (TP 8.20). The narrowness of their role means that it is clear
that their power is limited and specific in purpose; so long as they stick to this
role, they do not limit any legitimate aspect of the patriciate’s rule, nor them-
selves attempt substantively to rule. Furthermore, within their narrow domain
of responsibility they uphold patrician equality. They conduct their business
in an internally democratic way, and every patrician has a fair chance one day
to be a syndic (TP 8.28, 30).
Thus, the case of aristocracy teaches that even when a political order is
constrained to abide by the rule of law by the power of a multitude, for Spinoza
this power is not best exercised through a direct democratic procedure. Rather,
institutional mediation of that power, by the parcelling out of narrow powers
to groups which are insulated from direct democratic decision, is the better
path.14 Such parcelling is likely to meet success when the domain of its respon-
sibility is narrow, and when it is patently procedurally fair.
This conclusion has implications not only for reconstructing Spinoza’s
missing chapter on democracy, but also for any attempt to build a present-day
theory of democracy on Spinozist foundations. The power of democratic mul-
titude is expressed through a framework of equality and an orientation towards
the common good within the strictures of which directly democratic decisions
can be made; it is not to be identified with direct democracy itself. Corre-
spondingly, a democracy should renounce its capacity to determine every ele-
ment of the political order by its direct democratic will. Indeed, even social
movements, in order to sustain themselves beyond the initial blush of enthusi-
asm, create structures of self-limitation (meeting procedures, decision rules,
delegation of responsibility); and it is proper that they do so. In the formal
sphere of government, the establishment of intermediate and semi-indepen-
dent bodies need not be seen as a counterweight to the power of the multitude,
but rather a potential mode of its expression, insofar as these bodies effectively
serve to limit the counterproductive and self-corrupting tendencies of mass
democracy. An example is provided by the existence of an independent elec-
toral commission, as is the case in Australia but not in America, which deter-
mines electoral boundaries and conducts elections without itself being directly
controlled by electoral democracy.
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Spinoza complains that as a result of their idealising approach, philoso-
phers ‘have never worked out a political theory that can have practical appli-
cation’ (TP 1.1). The task for radical democrats aspiring to learn from
Spinoza is not simply to decry institutional mediation, but instead to discern
which particular institutions facilitate the power of the multitude, and encour-
age it to develop in a more virtuous direction. Even though there is always
the risk that non-mass institutions will alienate and thwart the multitude’s
power, far from there being a relation of opposition between the multitude
and such institutions, a serious Spinozist approach to democracy will take an
active interest in such forms.
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Notes
1.    Related conceptions of constituent power are evident in Wolin (1994), Montag (1999: 80–
89) and Kalyvas (2005). 
2.    Criticisms of Negri’s Spinozism have focussed on its teleology and its periodisation of
Spinoza’s works, not its account of democracy. See Macherey (1983) and Holland (1998:
par. 16–29).
3.    Negri (1998: 28–30) claims that Spinoza’s theory of the multitude is only fully developed
in the late Political Treatise (Spinoza 2000). Correspondingly, I focus primarily on this
text. However, I also make use of the Ethics (Spinoza 1994) and the Theological-political
Treatise (Spinoza 2001). I rely on Spinoza (1972) for the Latin text.
4.    Negri insists that Spinoza presents a realistic theory, not a utopian one (1991: 217–33;
2004b: 9).
5.    Elsewhere, Negri characterises the external force differently, as mystification or ideology
(Negri 2004b: 22–4).
6.    Such a view is not unique to Negri. Despite criticising Negri’s account of the entirely pre-
institutional multitude, Tully (2008) himself appears committed to an idea of the virtue of
political collectivities’ immanent informal constitutions, which are only corrupted and
made unfree by the imposition of modern (formal juridical) constitutions.
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7.    Contrary to Negri’s view that ‘each rupture of the flow [of the multitude] and every estab-
lishment of a rigid form is an act of violence in relation to the tendencies of Spinoza’s
physics’ (1998: 234).
8.    See also TTP P/1, 16/174–5.
9.    This analysis applies to the alienating political orders which arise within a given society. It
does not necessarily apply so well to situations of colonialism and conquest, in which exter-
nal military force is used to establish the alienating institutions.
10.    To be sure, in his own theory of radical democracy, Negri distances itself from direct
democracy understood as mere voting, but only because a community must engage together
in substantial common activity in order truly to count as democratic. He certainly favours
direct popular decision over any institutional delegation of decisions (Hardt and Negri
2000: 373; 2004: xvi, 350–1).
11.    See also Smith (2005), Feuer (1958: 136–98), Steinberg (2008), Duff (1903: 365–450). .
12.    Spinoza does offer an account of democracy at TTP 16/177–9. However, I agree with Negri
that the analysis of politics in TTP is less sophisticated and less defensible that in TP; con-
sequently, I join Negri in attempting to reconstruct the TP view of democracy.
13.    It is not clear how Negri reconciles this idea with Spinoza’s discussion of Turkish despo-
tism, which is durable despite the pressure it places on its subjects’ power (TP 6.4).
14.    Balibar also argues that Negri is wrong to say Spinoza rejects the mediation of law and of
a hierarchy of councils. However, Balibar does not discuss the distinctive role of smaller
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